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The paper discusses from a metaphysical standpoint the nature of the
dependence relation underpinning the talk of mutual action between mate-
rial and spatiotemporal structures in general relativity. It is shown that the
standard analyses of dependence in terms of causation or grounding are ill-
suited for the general relativistic context. Instead, a non-standard analytical
framework in terms of structural equation modeling is exploited, which leads
to the conclusion that the kind of dependence encoded in the Einstein field
equations is a novel one.
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1 Introduction
In their comprehensive textbook on general relativity, Misner, Thorne, and Wheeler
encapsulated the spirit of the theory in the famous motto “Space acts on matter,
telling it how to move. In turn, matter reacts back on space, telling it how to curve”
(Misner et al., 1973, p. 5). This metaphor does indeed a good job in conveying the
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basic idea behind the Einstein field equations, which can be schematically written
as (Greek indexes run from 0 to 3):
Gµν[gµν] = κTµν[Φ, gµν]. (1)
(1) basically describes the non-linear coupling (through an appropriate constant κ)
of the metrical field gµν (on which Einstein tensor Gµν depends) with the material
field(s) Φ, whose physical properties are encoded in the stress-energy tensor Tµν.1
An interesting question to be asked then is: how much should we read into
Misner, Thorne, and Wheeler’s description of (1)? In particular, how seriously
should we take the reference to action and reaction? In everyday thinking, we
are accustomed to the idea that matter acts on other matter in a straightforward
sense. For example, we have no problem to accept that, under certain conditions,
we can act on a door in a way that determines its opening. Thus, whether the
opening of the door obtains depends on whether it is pushed. However, things
become much less clear and intuitive when we try to apply the same picture to
spatiotemporal structures determining the geodesic motions of material bodies,
or to massive bodies determining the geometry of spacetime. Even adopting a
skeptical attitude towards the existence of spacetime does not ease the puzzlement,
because then we have to explain why Misner, Thorne, and Wheeler’s metaphor is
in fact so powerful.
In the following, I will analyze from a metaphysical standpoint the determina-
tion relation underlying the talk of mutual action between material and spatiotem-
poral structures in general relativity. I will pay particular attention to the first part
of the afore-mentioned metaphor, discussing in what sense spacetime determines
the geodesic motion of freely-falling bodies. In the next two sections, I will review
the current philosophical debate on the subject, highlighting the controversy sur-
rounding the notion of action. In section 4 I will introduce a non-standard frame-
work for the analysis of dependence relations, which involves structural equations
modeling. Finally, in section 5, I will show how such a framework is able to
clarify the source of the controversy, concluding that the relation encoded in (1)
represents a novel kind of dependence.
2 Are spatiotemporal properties causal?
The most straightforward reaction one can have towards Misner, Thorne, and
Wheeler’s motto is to take it at face value: spacetime does not metaphorically
guide matter, it literally causes bodies to freely fall. This plain causal reading of
spatiotemporal properties can come in different flavors. One of the most devel-
oped proposals in this sense is due to Alexander Bird (see, e.g., Bird, 2009). In
1Note how the stress-energy tensor itself functionally depends on the metric tensor gµν.
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a nutshell, Bird claims that spatiotemporal properties –if fundamental– are essen-
tially dispositional. Such a stance relies on the later Einstein’s invocation of an
action-reaction principle in order to account for the reciprocity encoded in the field
equations of general relativity (see Brown and Lehmkuhl, 2016, for a discussion
of the evolution of Einstein’s views on the subject). In Bird’s words:
In dispositional essentialist terms, we can see that by being potential
manifestations of dispositional essences, spatial and temporal proper-
ties may also have dispositional essences themselves. [T]hat perspec-
tive is precisely that endorsed by General Relativity. Each spacetime
point is characterized by its dynamical properties, i.e. its disposition
to affect the kinetic properties of an object at that point, captured in
the gravitational field tensor at that point. The mass of each object is
its disposition to change the curvature of spacetime, that is to change
the dynamical properties of each spacetime point. Hence all the rel-
evant explanatory properties in this set-up may be characterized dis-
positionally.
(Bird, 2009, p. 240)
In other words, Bird argues that, according to general relativity, spacetime is
recipient of change caused by matter but, given the reciprocity encoded in the Ein-
stein field equations, that means that spacetime is able to cause a change in mat-
ter. Under this reading, spatiotemporal properties are active in a straightforward
causal sense, and the kind of dependence relation among material and spatiotem-
poral facts underlying the Einstein field equations looks like a close relative of
everyday causation.2 Or does it?
The main conceptual problem with Bird’s view is that possessing a disposi-
tional essence necessarily entails an appropriate counterfactual.3 In the case at
hand, such a counterfactual would be something like “were the metrical structure
to undergo a variation, the mass-energy distribution would change as well”. The
way we would evaluate the truth value of this counterfactual would be: take a
solution of the Einstein field equations that depicts the actual situation 〈gµν,Tµν〉,
feed a small perturbation of the metric tensor in the field equations, and if they
give back a model with a (slightly) different Tµν then the counterfactual is true.4
The talk of “small perturbations” is the general relativistic way to refer to the
possible world nearest to the actual one. The problem with this way of proceeding
2Here we are just taking for granted that dispositions are causally relevant, cf. McKitrick
(2005) for discussion.
3For the time being, let us just focus on Lewis-style counterfactuals. We will later consider
alternative approaches to counterfactual reasoning.
4Of course, given the reciprocity encoded in (1), the same reasoning can be repeated mutatis
mutandis for the dependence of spacetime geometry on the mass-energy distribution.
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is that, in general, it is not possible to non-arbitrarily fix the nearest possible world.
To have a rough idea,5 imagine we have a world with just one massive body.
Can we evaluate the counterfactual “were the body to disappear, the geometry
of the universe would be everywhere flat”? Intuitively, we would say that this
counterfactual is true but, in practice, we have to compare the starting model with
a solution of vacuum field equations Gµν[gµν] = 0. For sure, Minkowski spacetime
is one of these solutions, but not the only one. We therefore need some additional
extra-dynamical argument to fix the Minkowski solution as the nearest world to
the starting one.
It does not take much to realize that the issues with evaluating counterfactual
changes in general relativity are a direct consequence of the dynamical nature of
the spacetime structures described by this theory. To see this, just make a compar-
ison with Newtonian mechanics. In this latter theory, the main features of space-
time are fixed both in a physical –i.e. spacetime structures are not influenced by
material ones– and a metaphysical sense –i.e. all possible worlds in which New-
tonian mechanics holds feature the same spacetime structures (see Vassallo, 2016,
for an appraisal of background spatiotemporal structures from a metaphysical per-
spective). As a consequence of this metaphysical rigidity, it is always possible to
use Newtonian background structures as a standard against which any counterfac-
tual change can be evaluated. Curiel (2015) makes a nice case:
[O]ne may be interested in the question: what would happen to the
orbits of the planets in the Solar System if the sun were to vanish?
Nothing simpler. Plug in [the initial-value formulation] the new val-
ues for the sun’s size and mass (viz., zero), compute the new orbits,
and compare them to the original ones by using the background si-
multaneity and affine structures as referential framework. [...] There
is no need for the ad hoc fixing of comparison classes of systems, or
for the ad hoc fixing of methods for identifying “the same quantity
of the same system at the same place and same time, under otherwise
different conditions or in otherwise different states”. It’s all fixed nat-
urally and canonically from the start.
(ibid., p. 4)
Clearly, such a referential framework is not available in general relativity, thus
making the evaluation of counterfactual change a rather tricky issue. The immedi-
ate consequence of the troubles with Lewisian counterfactuals in general relativity
is that the Einstein field equations by themselves are unable to provide a robust
enough “causal-like” link between spacetime and matter.
We may ask whether there can be a different approach according to which
spatiotemporal properties can be given a straightforward causal reading without
5See Curiel (2015, section 3) for a formally rigorous example.
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resorting to Lewis-style counterfactual analysis. In other words, can we provide
a sound story according to which spacetime points (or small spacetime regions)6
perform an action on material bodies, which “shapes” their trajectories? If dis-
positions are not enough to do the job, perhaps we can base our characterization
of action on something more physically tangible, such as some sort of energy-
momentum transfer. After all, this seems to be the exact idea underlying, e.g.,
the slingshot effect exploited in astronautics. Roughly, we speak of the slingshot
effect when a spacecraft passing near, say, a massive planet, gains some energy-
momentum from the planet’s gravitational field and, thus, accelerates.
This well-known physical effect might seem to perfectly fit an account of cau-
sation in terms of physical processes –such as the conserved quantity approach
(see, e.g., Dowe, 2000). According to this view, spacetime would “push” ma-
terial bodies into geodesic motion by transmitting a certain amount of energy-
momentum to them. This would be a picture even more physically-laden than
the one given in terms of dispositions. However, there are at least two reasons
to regard this position as awkward if applied to geodesic motions in general rel-
ativity. The first, and most obvious, is that geodesic motions in general relativity
can be regarded as “default” motions in a sense similar to that of inertial mo-
tions in Newtonian mechanics, i.e. the type of motions associated to isolated (i.e.
non-interacting) bodies. Hence, it is not clear at all how the notion of energy trans-
fer can be consistently introduced in the description of geodesic motions without
running into troubles. For example, would that mean that there is a “true” default
motion that involves no energy transfer at all, which just happens to be hidden
from view because of spacetime’s “push”?
Secondly, general relativity teaches us to be very careful when considering lo-
cal energy-momentum exchange processes. In a nutshell, the problem is that, in
general relativity, the gravitational energy-momentum is represented by a quan-
tity –a pseudo-tensor– that is not invariant under coordinate transformations. This
means that gravitational energy-momentum cannot be defined locally in a unique
–i.e., observer-independent– way, which in turn disrupts the general description
of energy-momentum transfer processes in a given spacetime region (for a techni-
cal justification and a philosophical discussion of this problem see Curiel, 2000;
Lam, 2011). Even if this does not automatically rule out the possibility to make
substantial physical sense of gravitational energy (and transfer thereof) in general
relativity (see Read, 2018, for a recent effort in this sense), still it is apparent that
defending the conserved quantity approach in this context is a tremendously hard
task.
6This way of talking should not trick the reader into believing that the present discussion re-
quires a substantivalist attitude. In fact, the relationalist can take the reference to spacetime points
or regions as a verbal shortcut to address aspects of a web of spatiotemporal relations among
material bodies.
5
The above mentioned issues are exploited in Livanios (2008) to come up with a
straightforward anti-causal argument. The premises of the argument are that (P1)
spacetime does not force bodies to move geodesically (it just determines what the
available geodesic paths are), and (P2) causal processes always involve the action
of forces (at least, in fundamental physics). Then the obvious conclusion is that
spacetime does not causally act on matter.
How can Livanios’ argument be contrasted? We have already seen why the
denial of (P1) is rather problematic, but, even taking (P1) for granted, still Livan-
ios’ argument may be attacked by denying (P2) and, more precisely, by claiming
that general relativity is in fact a fundamental physical theory where the notion
of cause can be divorced from that of force. To this line of reasoning, Livanios
replies as follows:
Currently, there are three interpretations of what, according to GR, the
influence of spacetime on matter amounts to: Some physicists and
philosophers think of GR as “geometrising” away the gravitational
force, while others think of it as showing that all spatiotemporal phe-
nomena are expressions of the gravitational field. Finally, there is a
third view according to which, in the general relativistic context, there
is a conceptual identification of the gravitational field with the proper
spatiotemporal geometrical structure [cf. Lehmkuhl (2008)]. In nei-
ther of these interpretations we have an indication that GR dissociates
the concept of the cause from forces.
(Livanios, 2017, pp. 24-25)
The last sentence above is rather questionable. While it is true that neither
of these interpretations of GR dissociate the concept of cause from forces, it is
equally true that they do not associate the concepts either. All these interpreta-
tions address is the issue of the “arrow of reduction” between spacetime and the
gravitational field. This has nothing to do with the issue of causation per se.
Hence, if it is true that the problem with ascribing causal efficacy to spa-
tiotemporal properties in general relativity just stems from tacitly requiring that
such properties perform the causal job by exerting a force, then it seems that here
friends of causation have a chance to redeem themselves. Indeed, they can just
claim that anchoring the causal talk to the presence of forces is too strong a re-
quirement for causal dependence. This is exactly what Andreas Bartels does:
The answer to [Livanios’] objection is that, in General Relativity, met-
rical (affine) structure is the means by which the gravitational field
couples to matter. Spacetime affects matter not by means of classi-
cal forces, but by means of its metrical (and affine) structure which
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brings about tidal forces producing paradigmatic causal effects like
spatial deformations of material bodies.
(Bartels, 2013, p. 2005)
Bartels bases his causal thesis on a counterfactual analysis of causation alter-
native to the standard Lewisian analysis considered so far, namely, the interven-
tionist (or, manipulationist) framework (see Woodward, 2016, for an introduction
to the subject).
The core idea behind the interventionist approach is that a condition C causes
a condition E if and only if were C to be subjected to an exogenous process that
changes it, E would change as well. More prosaically: C causes E if and only
if by wiggling C, E wiggles as a result. Of course, the intervention behind the
wiggling of C does not have to be agential: any physical process external to the
system under scrutiny would do (hence the word exogenous used above). Insisting
that an intervention has to be external to the system is very important, because we
want to exclude that the wiggling of E is a consequence of the change in another
causal link that bypasses C. That being said, it is not necessary to claim that an
intervention has to be a possible physical process in a strict sense.7 All we require
is (i) to have a “coherent conception” of what it is to wiggle C, and (ii) to be able
to exclude “confounding” cases in which the change of E is not (just) due to the
wiggling of C.8 Hence, according to Woodward:
This suggests that there will be a basis for claims about what will
happen to E under an intervention on C as long as we can associate
some well-defined notion of change with C and as long as we have
some grounds for saying what the effect, if any, on E would be of
changing just C and nothing else.
(Woodward, 2003, p. 131)
In the case of general relativity, according to Bartels, this basis clearly exists,
and is represented by the formal machinery of the theory. Indeed, if we model
both C and E via some variables related by the laws of the theory, we are able to
evaluate any kind of counterfactual claim whose antecedent involves a change of
7To be fair, this is a contentious point. Some may object that, given that a cause is basically
a “handle” to manipulate effects, what it is to be a cause is defined by the very nature of the
associated intervention. Hence, it is quite suspicious to allow for interventions that are not realiz-
able –at least in principle– through a physically well-defined process. We will return to this point
in section 4. For the time being, we just stress the fact that there can be manipulationist accounts
stronger than the one discussed here, in the sense that they place more strict constraints on allowed
interventions.
8This further clarifies the sense in which an intervention on C has to be external to the system:
it has to sever any confounding causal connection “upstream” of C (in particular it must be the
case that C cannot affect E via any other causal route than the one probed by the intervention).
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value in the variable modeling the condition C, because it is the laws of the theory
themselves that provide a coherent conception of change and a non-confounding
link between antecedent and consequent. Let’s see how this works in the concrete
case of geodesic motions.
First of all, we model material motions by timelike curves xµ(λ) (λ represent-
ing an appropriate affine parameter): these are our dependent variables. The dy-
namically allowed curves –more precisely, the curves representing freely-falling
bodies– are the solutions to the equations of motion of general relativity9 (a dot
indicates standard differentiation with respect to λ):
x¨µ + Γµνσ x˙
ν x˙σ = 0. (2)
Equations (2) follow directly from (1) (see, e.g., Misner et al., 1973, section 20.6,
for a formal derivation) and represent the mathematical codification of the fact
that freely-falling (i.e. non-interacting) bodies move along the “straight lines”
of the geometry encoded in gµν. The measure of the “straightness” of a curve is
provided by a mathematical device called connection (usually symbolized by the
covariant derivative operator ∇), whose components are the so-called Christoffel
symbols Γµνσ appearing in (2). These Christoffel symbols are derived from the






gσρ,ν + gρν,σ − gνσ,ρ), 10 (3)
where the comma indicates standard differentiation with respect to the subsequent
index.
With this machinery in place, we proceed by indicating the exogenous vari-
able, i.e. the one to be wiggled. In our case, this is clearly the metric tensor gµν.
Let’s now consider a certain solution of the field equations 〈gµν,Tµν〉 (plus related
boundary conditions, if any). Such a model will have a set of geodesic motions
{xµi (λ)}i∈N given by the geodesic equation. The wiggling of gµν here amounts to
selecting a different metric g˜µν which is dynamically allowed, i.e., such that it is
part of another model 〈g˜µν, T˜µν〉. We then feed g˜µν into the formula (3) for the
coefficients of the connection and, consequently, in the geodesic equation. Of
course, the new set of solutions {x˜µi (λ)}i∈N of (2) will be different from the starting
one {xµi (λ)}i∈N. Hence, by intervening –in the loose sense justified above– on the
geometry of spacetime, we changed the geodesic motions of material bodies. The
causal verdict is thus positive: the geometrical properties of spacetime do cause
bodies to move with geodesic motion. Note how it is the theory itself that pro-
vides the conceptual apparatus needed to make clear (i) what it means to change
9See Tamir (2012) for a voice against this “canonical” view of geodesic motion.
10More precisely, this relation holds for a very particular kind of connection, called Levi-Civita.
I will come back to this point in section 5.
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the cause C, and (ii) how the depending condition E would change as a direct and
exclusive consequence of the wiggling C.
By basing his causal analysis on interventionism, Bartels is able to defuse
the objection that a causation-friendly treatment of spacetime in general relativity
has to imply or require that spacetime literally pushes material bodies to move
geodesically. In fact, the manipulationist framework does not seek to reduce the
notion of cause to any more fundamental notion (let alone that of force, or energy-
momentum exchange). Of course, the fact that the interventionist account of cau-
sation is non-reductive is not a problem in the context of our discussion, since
we are interested in assessing whether there is a causal link, and not in giving a
detailed conceptual account of what causation is.
How does Bartels’ proposal fare with respect to the issues with counterfac-
tuals evaluation in general relativity? Unfortunately for friends of causation, the
answer is: not that well. In fact, the manipulationist analysis sketched above
does not work on “small portions” of a model, that is, we cannot define surgical
interventions that affect only a condition local C while leaving everything else
untouched (which, again, is a key requirement if we want to avoid confounding
cases).
In the above example, the intervention works insofar as the geometry –that
is, a diffeomorphic class of metric tensors– over the whole model is changed:
it makes no sense to ask what would have happened if we changed it just in a
neighborhood of a point, leaving everything else unchanged. To see why it is so,
let’s assume that the model is well-behaved enough to admit a 3+1 decomposition
of the dynamics. What we would do to represent this local intervention would
be to take the values of the appropriate variables on an initial Cauchy 3-surface,
make a “small deformation” (that is, changing the value of the metric variables)
on a small neighborhood of the surface, and let the dynamics evolve the surface
to subsequent ones.
The problem is that, in this formulation, the Einstein field equations repre-
sent a geometrical constraint over the sequence of 3-surfaces embedded in a 4-
dimensional model. Therefore, deforming –even infinitesimally!– the geometry
of the initial 3-surface would most likely violate the embedding constraints and,
hence, the field equations themselves. Jaramillo and Lam (2018) give a detailed
technical justification for why it is so. Very roughly speaking, the geometrical
constraints can be cast as a set of non-linear and elliptic differential equations.
The non-linearity implies not only that a combination of solutions of the system
of equations does not constitute a solution by itself, but also that adding a “small
deformation” to a solution will not give in general a new solution. The elliptic-
ity of the system, on the other hand, points at the fact that the equations do not
strictly speaking describe any dynamical evolution for the initial data but, rather,
they encode global constraints for such data: this implies that the value taken on
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by a solution at a point generally depends on all the initial data over a Cauchy sur-
face. This is why it is extremely difficult to define a surgical intervention without
“messing up” the whole model.
To sum up, if an intervention is a dynamically allowed change in the value of
a variable, then interventions can mostly be “model-wide”, and causation loses
any interesting local connotation, i.e. setting aside few extremely favorable cases,
we cannot counterfactually test any causal link that would involve a surgical inter-
vention on a small part of the model (this problem is also discussed in the context
of frame-dragging effects in Hoefer, 2014, section 3). This is awkward not only
from an ontological perspective, but also from an explanatory one. For example,
we would be forced to say that the precession of Mercury’s perihelion is not an
effect just due to the surrounding spacetime geometry, but to the whole spacetime
geometry of the solar system.
In short, buying into this type of “causal non-locality” would push towards
a very strong type of holistic metaphysics, and would also imply that any expla-
nation of local state of affairs that mentions only the immediate spatiotemporal
surroundings of such states of affairs would be incomplete. This is quite a high
price to be paid to ascribe a causal nature to spatiotemporal properties. So, all
things considered, switching to an interventionist counterfactual approach is not
the panacea for defenders of the causal nature of spatiotemporal and material in-
fluences in general.
To conclude our review of the literature discussing the causal nature of spa-
tiotemporal properties in general relativity, let us consider an anti-causal argument
put forward in Katzav (2013). The gist of the argument is that being committed
to a causally-friendly view of spatiotemporal properties entails a commitment to
physically opaque instances of causation.
Katzav starts by noticing that a cause can bring about a non-occurrence in a
physically acceptable sense only as a result of the inhibition of some endeavor.
For example, imagine that a skinny hiker encounters a huge boulder on his path
and unsuccessfully tries to push it out of his way. In this case, we may say that
the non-occurrence of any boulder’s movement is caused by its huge mass. A
physicist would nicely describe such a scenario in terms of Newton’s second law
as an interaction between the hiker and the boulder, in which the boulder pushes
the ground “harder” than the hiker pushes the boulder. Thus, here, the mass of
the rock does an active job in preventing something –i.e. its sudden movement–
from happening. However, it would be physically awkward to claim that the huge
mass of the boulder causes the non-occurrence of its sudden acceleration when
no external force is exerted on it. In this second case, it does not seem right to
say that the rock’s mass does the job of preventing it from accelerating. In fact, a
physicist would explain the absence of this kind of motion by appealing to a non-
causal principle such as Newton’s first law. Insisting that, also in this case, mass
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plays an active causal role would clearly entail a commitment to spooky instances
of causation.
The next step in Katzav’s argument is to translate this line of reasoning to
geodesic motions in general relativity. Thus, the question is: can we say that the
geometrical properties of spacetime cause free bodies to move geodesically? Hav-
ing in mind Katzav’s criterion for physically acceptable instances of causation, we
might be tempted to say that, yes, spacetime causes geodesic motions to happen
by countering the bodies’ disposition to move non-geodesically.
However, such a picture is untenable for two reasons. First, similarly to the
energy-transfer case discussed earlier, it would seem that now the “natural” state
of motion of a body is opposed by spatiotemporal structures, and geodesic motions
are the result of such an opposing influence. This is, of course, not the story
told by general relativity, according to which geodesic motion is an instance of
persistence as is through motion –i.e. absence of change in any relevant physical
respect throughout the trajectory. Secondly, the explanation of geodesic motions
in this picture would look like the enactment of a cosmic conspiracy according to
which the true nature of free motions is hidden from our view.
If, instead, we admit that geodesic motions are not an effect of countering
hidden true motions, then the causal efficacy of spatiotemporal properties is called
into question as unfit to back up the physical explanation of the phenomenon.
Indeed, the most we can say in this case is that spacetime causes the absence of
inexplicable changes in the trajectories of freely-falling bodies. For sure, this is
not a “physics-friendly” instance of causation.
Katzav’s anti-causal argument is probably the most contentious among the
ones reviewed in this section. What is most puzzling about Katzav’s argument
is the premise that a cause can bring about a non-occurrence in a physically ac-
ceptable sense only as a result of the inhibition of some endeavor. Katzav here
is clearly brushing aside alternative –and equally acceptable– instances. For ex-
ample, spacetime might cause the non-occurrence of a certain trajectory xµ(λ) by
bringing about another trajectory x˜µ(λ) that is incompatible with xµ(λ).11 Given
that much of Katzav’s argument depends on this premise, it looks like he is provid-
ing the least cogent anti-causal case of the batch presented in this section. How-
ever, this is just a cold comfort for the fans of causation in general relativity, given
the much more troublesome issues discussed earlier –in particular, the problem of
meaningfully define counterfactual change in Lewis-style analysis, and the issue
with non-local interventions in the manipulationist approach.
11I am grateful to an anonymous referee for suggesting this objection.
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3 Are spatiotemporal properties non-causal?
So far, we have discussed in detail why and how general relativity does not rep-
resent a hospitable environment for fans of causation. Consequently, skeptics to-
wards causation seem to gain the upper hand in the debate. Or do they? Otherwise
said, can causal skeptics come up with a convincing metaphysical characterization
of the spacetime/matter-dependence?
Let’s go back to Livanios’ work, and see his own proposal:
[A] more cautious analysis points out another interpretation, accord-
ing to which the dynamical character of space-time allows the trans-
world variation of space-time structure in such a way that the Ein-
stein equations hold. In such an approach, we look upon the Einstein
equations as giving a law-like consistency constraint upon the joint
features (space-time structure and mass-energy distribution) of any
(physically) possible world.
(Livanios, 2008, p. 389)
Judging from the above quotation, it seems that Livanios has in mind some
sort of “physical possibility” relation, e.g., the geometry of a certain spacetime
region A determines (through the mediating role of (1)) the “physicality” of a cer-
tain trajectory xµ(λ) in A. We immediately see the problem with this proposal: it
assigns an inherently modal nature to the dependence relation underpinning the
Einstein field equations, and we already know that modality in general relativity
is a tricky issue. Indeed, such a relation (again, through the mediating role of (1)),
should support counterfactuals like “if the geometry of A were different, it would
be physically impossible for a freely falling object to move along xµ(λ) in A”. In
evaluating such a counterfactual, we would face the very same troubles already
encountered before. As already pointed out in section 2, because of the dynamical
character of spacetime, there is no objective trans-world standard against which
we can assess any notion of counterfactual variation. So there is no straightfor-
ward way to individuate the “changed version” of A in a possible world near to
the starting one (to catch a glimpse of the debate on trans-world individuation of
spacetime points and regions, see Earman, 1989, chapter 9, section 14).
The immediate reaction to my criticism is that it is unwarranted and stems
from a misguided reading of Livanios’ passage. In fact, Livanios’ quotation
should be intended as stating that this physical possibility relation is just a “model-
building” relation that couples metric tensors with stress-energy tensors in accor-
dance with (1). If that is the case, then all that we need is that only worlds in
which the Einstein field equations hold are physically possible. In particular, we
do not need to say anything about the evaluation of counterfactual change, possi-
ble worlds vicinity, or anything like that.
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Let’s accept for the sake of the argument that this is the case. Then a new
substantial issue presents itself: Livanios’ possibility relation becomes trivial to
the point of mere analyticity, thus morphing into some sort of conceptual neces-
sity relation. The main trouble with the relation of conceptual necessity is that
it usually supports very feeble explanations. For example, once we define what
a bachelor is, it becomes matter of conceptual necessity that “X is a bachelor”
obtains whenever “X is an unmarried man” obtains. However, the analytical link
between these two facts makes an explanation of the form “X is a bachelor because
X is an unmarried man” rather uninformative. In a similar vein, an explanation of
the form “such and such geometry is coupled to such and such mass-energy dis-
tribution because the Einstein field equations hold” is not very informative. The
most that we can learn from such an explanation is that the explanandum is not
merely an accident, in the sense that it is a particular instance of the law-like gen-
eralization constituting the explanans. This might be seen as some relevant piece
of information, but the fact remains that a scientifically satisfactory explanation
should mention much more then just the mere fact that (1) hold –for example, if
(1) are cast in Hamiltonian form in a way that entails a 3 + 1 decomposition of the
dynamics, then some boundary conditions together with the specification of the
initial conditions on a spacelike Cauchy surface would surely enter a satisfactory
explanation of the dynamical development.
Hence, it is doubtful whether Livanios’ relation of conceptual/nomic necessity
can be enough to do any interesting explanatory job. If that is all that the anti-
causal party can say about dependencies in general relativity, then they do not
seem to fare any better than the friends of causation in the debate.
At this point, if we want to make some progress, we need to pinpoint some
minimal desiderata that a convincing non-causal characterization of the depen-
dence relation underlying (1) should fulfill, and then see if metaphysicians have
something interesting to propose along these lines.
The first two desiderata should be basically a non-causal counterpart of the
prominent features of causal dependence. Hence, the first requirement is that
such a relation has to have explanatory power: for example, it should provide
a conceptually robust backbone for explaining inertial motions via geometrical
structure. The second desideratum is that it has to be a relation of determination
in a strong ontological sense, that is, the existence of a condition determining
the existence of another (e.g., the fact that freely-falling bodies move in such
and such a way obtains in virtue of the fact that spacetime has such and such
geometry). However, to avoid the problem that causal relations face in general
relativity, we should further require this relation not to be inherently modal, that
is, not to require modal notions in order to be defined (so supervenience would
not do for our purposes). Finally, in order to avoid triviality, we should exclude
that such a relation is just conceptual necessity.
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After a moment of reflection, we realize that there might be a good fit for this
description. Indeed, the above desiderata are fulfilled by a dependence relation
that metaphysicians call metaphysical grounding. The notion of grounding is a
lively debated topic among metaphysicians and, for obvious reasons, we cannot
go through the debate here (see the essays in Correia and Schnieder, 2012 to have
an idea of the state-of-the-art on the subject). For this reason, we will pick a
particular view on grounding, nicely exemplified by Paul Audi:
Grounding is the relation expressed by certain uses of the phrase “in
virtue of ,” as in “the act is wrong in virtue of its non-moral proper-
ties.” [...] We should not use “in virtue of” where it might express
a reflexive relation, such as identity. Since grounding is a relation of
determination, and closely linked to the concept of explanation, it is
irreflexive and asymmetric. [...] On my view, grounding is a singu-
lar relation between facts, understood as things having properties and
standing in relations. Facts, on this conception, are not true proposi-
tions, but obtaining states of affairs.
(Audi, 2012, pp. 102-103)
This brief characterization of grounding might make sense in general relativ-
ity: the Einstein field equations describe how a set of material (or spatiotempo-
ral) facts obtain in virtue of a set of spatiotemporal (or material) facts obtaining.
The word “obtaining” here has to be understood as ontological rather than simply
conceptual determination. In this vein, grounding can be thought of as a partial
ordering with respect of fundamentality, while causality is a partial ordering with
respect to time. This feature sounds good, because it means that grounding is
better-suited than causation for ordering facts about time, which are encoded in a
4-dimensional geometry.
So, have we finally selected a good candidate for the role of dependence rela-
tion is general relativity? Of course not!
There are at least two problems with metaphysical grounding as the relation
underpinning the dependence described by (1). The first is that, on this view,
Misner, Thorne, and Wheeler’s motto becomes at best an awkward metaphor.
The problem is not stylistic, but substantial: nobody would contend that there
is something straightforwardly physical in the way spacetime and matter act on
each other, and the notion of metaphysical grounding does not seem to capture
such a physical character in any way. For sure, nobody would claim that the sling-
shot effect clearly exemplifies a case of metaphysical grounding without feeling a
bit embarrassed. The second –and even worse– problem is that, according to (1),
material facts depend on spatiotemporal ones and viceversa. Hence, the require-
ment of asymmetry for grounding is in stark tension with the (prima facie) mutual
dependence encoded in the Einstein field equations. Otherwise said, the laws of
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general relativity do not favor any claim regarding geometrical facts being more
fundamental than material ones or the other way round. One may try to resist
this conclusion by pointing out that the stress-energy tensor in (1) depends on the
metric tensor, thus claiming that it is geometric facts that ground material facts in
a clear formal sense, and not viceversa. However, that would be too hasty: while
it is true that the stress-energy tensor depends on the metric tensor, we should
not overlook the fact that it also depends on material fields. Hence, the most we
can say is that the stress-energy tensor represents some sort of relational property
shared by geometry and material fields, but this does not make any of the two
more fundamental than the other (cf. Lehmkuhl, 2011 for a nice historical and
philosophical discussion of this point).
We have finally reached the core of the issue at stake. According to the po-
sitions reviewed in this section and the previous one, it is quite uncontroversial
that the Einstein field equations encompass a dependence relation between ma-
terial and spatiotemporal facts. However, nobody so far has been able to come
up with a convincing characterization of the dependence involved. For sure, such
a relation is explanatory in nature, it is not identity (unless (1) are taken to de-
fine a stress-energy tensor, which is controversial to say the least), and it is not
inherently modal (although it might have modal consequences, depending on the
particular view of modality adopted). However, it is too “physics-friendly” to be
just grounding yet not “physically active” enough to be just causation.
My take on the problem is that general relativity is trying to teach us a philo-
sophical lesson here, namely, that we are drawing too sharp a line between ground-
ing and causation. In the next section I am going to make this intuition clearer by
highlighting the well-known structural similarities between grounding and cau-
sation. In particular, I will draw on a recent proposal to analyze both grounding
and causation via a generalized formal framework designed to “spot” dependence
relations among facts.
4 A unified analysis of grounding and causation
As already said, the conceptual similarities between grounding and standard cau-
sation have not gone unnoticed in the philosophical literature. To begin with, they
are both usually modeled as irreflexive, transitive and, hence, asymmetric binary
relations i.e. strict partial orderings. Moreover, it can be easily argued that they
both take facts as relata. In a nutshell, talk of causation between events can be
reduced to talk of causation between facts about events happening (see Mellor,
1995, for an extensive articulation and defense of this view). If we accept this
similarity between the two, then it is easy to extend this analogy to the distinction
between partial/full ground on the one hand, and contributory/sufficient cause on
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the other. But the structural similarities between grounding and causation run
deeper than this. This fact becomes apparent if we analyze textbook cases of both
of them through the structural equation modeling (SEM) framework. SEM is an
umbrella term that groups together many mathematical and statistical tools used
to investigate possible ordered structures underlying huge datasets (see Westland,
2015, for a historical survey of this rather heterogeneous set of methodologies).
For our purposes, we are interested in the particular framework for testing causal
links originally developed in Pearl (2000). As it will become apparent in a mo-
ment, such a framework shares some characteristic traits with the “generic” inter-
ventionist approach advocated by Bartels and discussed in section 2. However, the
SEM framework shows some new interesting features that makes it more suitable
for being applied in the context of general relativity.
Without going too much into technical details, a structural equation model for
causation consists in a set of variables that can be further grouped into endoge-
nous (i.e. those variables modeling the dependent conditions in the causal chain),
and exogenous (those variables that bring about the effects in the causal chain).
Exogenous and endogenous variables are related by a set of equations that give
a quantitative description of the dependence relations involved. These equations
are basically functional relations, where the independent variables are exogenous
and the dependent variables are endogenous. There is no a priori constraint on the
type of functions involved, the only desiderata being that (i) the model has to ade-
quately reproduce the correlation patterns observed in the original dataset, and (ii)
the causal chain has to be consistent with the general principles used to justify the
model. It is important to note that, since the framework is able to describe struc-
tured dependence chains, the exogenous/endogenous distinction is relative: given
a certain link of the chain, all variables “downstream” will be endogenous and all
those “upstream” will be exogenous. To fix the ideas and keep things simple, in
the following we will mainly discuss toy cases of single-link chains, so that the ex-
ogenous/endogenous distinction becomes absolute. Once the way the framework
works becomes clear, generalization to more complex chains is straightforward.
How can we say that a model adequately reproduces the correlations? Very
simply, we just assign to the exogenous variables the actual values of the dataset
and we see if the functions posited give back the actual values of the endoge-
nous variables. Once this is achieved, we test the consistency of the causal chain
by wiggling each of exogenous variables (i.e. assigning to them values different
from the actual ones) and see if the functional dependence determines an appro-
priate wiggling of the endogenous ones. This procedure becomes clearer if we
rephrase it in terms of manipulationist counterfactuals: “if an intervention were
to set an exogenous variable to such and such value, the endogenous variables
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would have taken on such and such values”.12 If the counterfactual pattern gen-
erated in this way is consistent with the particular laws underlying the process
under scrutiny, then the model can be considered as successfully catching a causal
structure underpinning the correlations observed in the dataset.
The standard toy example that shows how the SEM framework “spots” causa-
tion involves the correlation between the shattering of a window on the throwing
of a stone. In this case, if we take the laws of classical mechanics to be true, we
would guess that the dependent part of the system is the window. We thus use
an endogenous variable “S ” to model the fact that the window shatters and we let
this variable take on two values {0, 1} depending on whether this fact obtains or
not. Likewise, we employ the exogenous variable T ∈ {0, 1} to model whether the
fact that the stone is thrown obtains or not. The functional dependence in this case
would be simply S ←= T . Notice that the symbol “←=” highlights that the relation
between the two variables is asymmetric.
Imagine that our dataset concerns one hundred repetitions of an experiment
consisting in throwing a stone of fixed mass, shape, and initial velocity against
a standardly crafted window, showing that the window shatters in 99% of the
cases. Then our assignment of the actual value of the exogenous variable would
be T = 1, which gives S = 1. So the model adequately reproduces the correlations
in the dataset.13 The next step would then be to wiggle T and see if the ensuing
counterfactual patterns are consistent with the laws of materials science. We get
that “were an intervention to prevent the stone from being thrown, the window
would not have shattered” is true under the model (setting T = 0 leads to S = 0),
while the counterfactual “were an intervention to prevent the stone from being
thrown, the window would have shattered” turns out to be false as required, to-
gether with the counterfactual “were the stone to be thrown, the window would not
have shattered”. Moreover, by construction, the model makes backtracking coun-
terfactuals such as “were a manipulation to shatter the window, the stone would
have been thrown” false, because an intervention on the window would sever the
link that S has with T (which implies that any manipulation on T does not affect
S ).
The result of our analysis is that our model works, so it can reliably be taken
as representing a genuine causal dependence underlying the correlations in the
starting dataset. Note how this treatment inherits all the advantages that a manip-
ulationist account of causation has against the usual Lewisian analysis. First of all,
12Also in this case, in order to avoid confounding cases, it is required that an intervention on a
variable disrupts all the links upstream of this variable.
13The model can be easily expanded to account for more complex situations. For example, if
there are two stone throwers, then we have to add another exogenous variable T ′ ∈ {0, 1} and
another structural equation, i.e. S ←= T ′. This also shows how the framework deals with cases of
causal overdetermination.
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the framework dispenses with the talk of possible worlds. Second, it avoids back-
tracking counterfactuals by construction. Third, it permits not only the analysis of
token cases of causation (i.e. the stone with such and such characteristics thrown
at the window crafted in such and such way), but also of type cases (the equation
S ←= T is totally general and applies to all cases of a single stone being thrown at a
window). Fourth, the analysis is quantitative in nature,14 which permits a deeper
understanding of the causal dynamics involved.
That being said, the SEM framework so sketched differs substantially from
the manipulationist approach discussed in section 2. The most striking difference
between the two can be tracked down –recalling Woodward’s quotation on page
7– to the theoretical basis for assessing “claims about what will happen to E under
an intervention on C”. In the approach discussed in section 2, interventions were
evaluated directly against the laws or principles of the particular theory (or set of
theories) which constituted a viable theoretical basis for the context under consid-
eration. In this way, such laws had a twofold role, namely, to provide a coherent
notion of what a manipulation amounts to, and to constitute a formal machinery
for evaluating the effects of any given manipulation. To get a more vivid idea of
how this works, let’s return to the stone/window example. In this case, as already
said, a viable theoretical framework to back up the interventionist analysis might
be Newtonian mechanics and, in particular, the laws of inelastic scattering. Note
how these laws give a clear physical description of the situation we are analyzing
and provide the formal machinery for the quantitative evaluation of concrete cases
in which the stone is (or is not) thrown against the window.
In the SEM framework, on the other hand, such a formal machinery for quanti-
tative evaluations is provided by the structural equations themselves. Now, while
such equations surely have to be consistent with the laws and principles of the
theoretical framework adopted to justify the model, they may or may not coincide
with the actual form of the laws or principles involved in justifying the adoption
of the model, depending on the level of detail required by the analysis. Again,
in the stone/window example, the equation S ←= T is not a physical description
of inelastic scattering, but it models how some (physical) facts would bring about
other facts were the laws of inelastic scattering to be true: If all we want to test
is the systematic obtaining (or non-obtaining) of S under the condition that T
obtains (or does not obtain), then the model is detailed enough. If, instead, we
wanted a detailed analysis of, say, how far the glass debris fly in relation to the
initial momentum of the stone, then we would use a much more complicated set of
structural equations, which would coincide with the laws of Newtonian dynamics
14This means that we can create more complex models where variables do not have to be binary.
For example, we can have a more accurate stone/window model with stone’s momentum as the
exogenous variable and glass’ deformation as the endogenous one.
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(or be a suitable approximation thereof).
This distinction between structural equations and underlying laws has a clear
bearing on the constraints that an intervention has to obey. For, if the model co-
incided with the actual dynamical description of the modeled process, any inter-
vention had to be directly encoded in the fundamental equations of the underlying
theory. However, in the SEM framework there is no such restriction, the only con-
straints being that the model be logically consistent with the underlying laws or
principles, and correctly reproduce the correlations in the dataset.
This fact makes it possible in many cases to come up with structural equations
which feature variables whose range can include values associated with physically
or even metaphysically impossible interventions. This liberal attitude towards the
wiggling of the exogenous variables is not a problem, because interventions by
themselves are to be seen as a conceptual stress test for the structure of the model:
if such a structure reproduces the observed correlations and remains consistent
with the underlying justificatory principles under any “strain”, then the model is a
solid one. If you want, you can picture a causal model as a system of connected
springs inside the rigid box of the justificatory principles invoked: it provides ex-
tra conceptual degrees of freedom to an otherwise conceptually rigid apparatus.
This peculiarity of the SEM analysis looks very encouraging in view of applying it
to the general relativistic context. Indeed, the main problem with Bartels’ manip-
ulationist proposal was that evaluating counterfactuals directly against the laws of
general relativity dramatically constrained the scope of manipulations and, con-
sequently, the effectiveness of the dependence analysis. In the SEM framework,
counterfactuals would be evaluated against a structural model, thus giving more
room for analytical maneuver, while still remaining consistent with the laws of
the theory. We will elaborate more extensively on this point in the next section.
At this point, however, the objection already presented in footnote 7 becomes
all the more daunting. Let’s repeat it here: the nature of a cause is deeply en-
tangled with the nature of the associated manipulation; hence, physically or even
metaphysically impossible interventions would make for conceptually obscure –if
not ill-defined– causal conditions. Quoting again Woodward:
[T]he claim that an asteroid impact caused the extinction of the di-
nosaurs can be understood within an interventionist framework as a
claim about what would have happened to the dinosaurs if an inter-
vention had occurred to prevent such an asteroid impact during the
relevant time period. In this case we have both (i) a reasonably clear
conception of what such an intervention would involve and (ii) princi-
pled ways of determining what would happen if such an intervention
were to occur. By contrast, neither (i) nor (ii) hold if we are asked to
consider hypothetical interventions that make it the case that 2+2 , 4
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or that the same object is at the same time both pure gold and pure
aluminum or that transform human beings into houseflies. Causal
claims that require for their explication claims about what would hap-
pen under such interventions [. . . ] are thus unclear or at least have no
legitimate role in empirical inquiry.
(Woodward, 2008, p. 224)
A possible reply to this objection is that the characterization of causal condi-
tions on the SEM framework shifts the accent from the nature of manipulations
to the aptness of the corresponding variables in modeling the particular situation
analyzed. For example, we can minimally require that apt variables should take
on values that represent distinct conditions, that distinct values of the same vari-
able should represent mutually exclusive alternatives, and that variables represent
enough conditions to capture the structure of the situation being analyzed (cf.
Blanchard and Schaffer, 2017, section 1.3, and references therein, for a discus-
sion of aptness constraints). The important point is that these aptness constraints
make the nature of causal conditions and their change intelligible and meaningful
to the particular context considered. For example, there is no particular prob-
lem in constructing a scientifically justified causal model that backs up a claim
like “If human beings suddenly turned into houseflies, urban environments would
collapse”, even if no scientific theory would give you a basis for characterizing
the change of a variable from “human being” to “housefly”. Likewise, we can
perfectly understand that a manipulation that sets the variable to, say, “Vulcan”
instead of “housefly” would lead to opposite effects on urban environments (since
we all agree that Vulcans are more rational than both houseflies and human be-
ings). Of course, the skeptic might still point out that such an approach works
only on a case-by-case basis, especially when we already have a fairly clear idea
of where to look in order to spot a dependence. To this claim I will not reply
here, being content to notice that the analysis of spacetime/matter-dependencies
in general relativity is in fact one of these felicitous cases.
The liberal attitude towards interventions is a key assumption if we want to
show that the SEM framework analyzes cases of grounding in the same way as it
handles standard causation. Here I will mainly draw from Schaffer (2016, section
2) and Wilson (2017, section 5), in which such an extension of the framework to
grounding is proposed and worked out.
Consider now a textbook case of grounding, namely the existence of singleton
Socrates being grounded in the existence of Socrates. Clearly, our intuition here is
that the fact that “singleton Socrates exists” obtains is dependent on the fact that
“Socrates exists” obtains. Let’s call the endogenous variable modeling the former
fact S ∈ {0, 1}, and the exogenous variable modeling the latter fact T ∈ {0, 1}. Not
surprisingly, the structural equation modeling this dependence would be S ←= T .
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The assignment of the actual value to T would be 1, which gives S = 1: this
models the truth of “If Socrates exists, then singleton Socrates exists”. Now we
wiggle T to zero and, as a consequence, S becomes zero. This symbolizes the
truth of the counterfactual “were an intervention to prevent Socrates from existing,
singleton Socrates would not have existed”, which is exactly what we would have
expected given our metaphysical treatment of grounding.
Moreover, the model falsifies by construction the counterfactual “were an in-
tervention to prevent singleton Socrates from existing, Socrates would not have
existed” (see Wilson, 2018, section 4, for a detailed analysis of how the SEM
framework treats this counterfactual). Note that the antecedent of this counter-
factual is metaphysically impossible. This is the case not because there are no
metaphysically possible ways for singleton Socrates to fail to exist, but because,
in this context, an external intervention that directly sets S to 0 would sever the
metaphysically necessary link between the ground T and grounded S . Just to be
clear, an intervention consisting in killing Socrates (or Socrates’ mother) would
not count as a direct (external) intervention on singleton Socrates, since it would
in fact exploit the link from T to S . If the reader is now having a very hard time
thinking of a way to directly intervene on S without passing through T , then she
is starting to grasp what a metaphysically impossible intervention means in this
context (cf. Wilson, 2017, section 6, for a discussion of this type of impossible
interventions). This, in a nutshell, is why this generalized SEM framework needs
to allow for metaphysically impossible interventions.15
If we agree on this analysis, then it is clear that the above statement depicts
a counterpossible situation on the considered model. Now, according to standard
counterfactual semantics, counterpossible statements are trivially true, which is
clearly unacceptable in this context. This is why this treatment demands a new,
non-standard semantics to be built up (see, again, Wilson, 2018 for a preliminary
discussion of this issue). Also in this case, the framework is able to account for
both the token case involving Socrates, and the type case involving a singleton
and its element.
Once the analogy between the stone/window and the element/singleton cases
is acknowledged, it is easy to see how the framework can be pushed further to
handle dependencies involving absences. For example, we can have T ∈ {0, 1}
modeling the fact that I water the plant, and S ∈ {0, 1} modeling the fact that
the plant dies. According to the laws that govern the physiology of plants, the
structural equation in this case would be S ←= 1 − T . Readers without a green
thumb have certainly experienced the validity of this model. It is a simple exercise
15To be fair, some authors (e.g. Leuenberger, 2014) tend to deny that the obtaining of the
grounding fact always necessitates the obtaining of the grounded fact. However, in order to defend
the need for metaphysically impossible interventions in the generalized SEM framework, we just
need that necessitation between ground and grounded holds at least sometimes.
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to show that this model works perfectly well also if we say that T models the fact
that unicorns exist and S models the fact that the set of unicorns is empty. Of
course, these analogies can be pushed even further, to embrace more complex
models.
To sum up, if we generalize the SEM framework for causation to include a
“liberal” view of manipulationist counterfactuals and a non-standard semantics
for counterpossibles, then we obtain a powerful analytical tool to analyze not only
instances of causation, but also instances of grounding. This generalized SEM
framework is very peculiar in that, from a structural perspective, it is blind to any
distinction between grounding and causation. For example, it does not distinguish
the stone/window case from the element/singleton case: from the framework’s
point of view they are both instances of a structural dependence of the form X ←= Y .
However, there is a clear sense in which, even in the generalized SEM framework,
we can still distinguish grounding from causation. This distinction basically boils
down to the “mediating” or “formative” principles used, that is, the set of prin-
ciples invoked to justify the structural relations of a model. If these principles
are just laws of nature (as in the stone/window case), then we are dealing with an
instance of causation; if just metaphysical or mathematical principles are invoked
(as in the element/singleton case), then that is a case of grounding (see Wilson,
2019 for a thorough defense of this law-based demarcation criterion against more
usual criteria, such as that stating that causation is a diachronic relation, while
grounding is not). Nevertheless, such a distinction is strictly speaking external to
the SEM framework, i.e., it is superimposed on the formalism without having any
bearing on the results. From an internal point of view, what matters is just the
functional dependencies established.
So, how far should we take the structural analogy between grounding and
causation highlighted by the generalized SEM framework presented? The most
conservative reaction is not to read too much into this. Even if grounding and
causation might share some similar features, this is not enough to make the case
for them to be related in a way that goes beyond some sort of vague conceptual
resemblance (e.g. both being mentioned in explanation-related context), let alone
considering them as metaphysically related (e.g. one being reducible to the other).
However, nothing speaks against taking the grounding/causation analogy more
seriously. In fact, there is a class of SEM models where, I believe, the idea of
grounding and causation being somewhat metaphysically related gains traction.
This class of models involves mixed chains of dependencies.
To have a down-to-earth example, imagine a case in which a football player
crosses the ball inside the penalty area and hits a defender’s hand, thus determin-
ing a penalty kick. An appropriate functional model of this situation would be
justified on the basis of both the laws of physics (the ball being kicked in such and
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such a way determines a trajectory that encounters the defender’s hand at a certain
point in space) and the rules of football (the handball determining a penalty kick).
If we think that grounding and causation are substantially unrelated concepts,
the SEM analysis of this situation looks a bit artificial in that there is a formal
continuity in the treatment of the chain of dependencies that leads from crossing
the ball into the penalty area to awarding a penalty kick yet a conceptual discon-
tinuity involving some links of this chain. In other words, even if we depict the
situation as a seamless chain of dependent facts –which, by the way, perfectly fits
our intuitions–, from an ontological perspective, we nevertheless have two sepa-
rate series of dependent facts, namely, (i) the crossing of the ball causing the ball
hitting the defender’s hand, and (ii) the penalty kick being awarded in virtue of
the handball being sanctioned.
If, instead, we are willing to accept that some sort of relation between causa-
tion and grounding really holds, then no such issue arises. The dependence chain
regains its conceptual unity through the relatedness of the two concepts, and this
also explains why the SEM analysis of mixed chains perfectly fits our everyday
understanding of the situation as a seamless sequence of facts. This is indeed a
key point to be highlighted since, as we are going to see in a moment, dependence
chains in general relativity are in fact mixed.
5 Dependence relations in general relativity: A pos-
sible answer
Let’s step aside for a moment from the grounding/causation relatedness question,
and let’s just try to apply the generalized SEM analysis to the case of geodesic
motions being dependent on geometrical facts in general relativity. As we are
going to see, resorting to the SEM framework gives the issue a clear formal setting
and, by doing so, brings to the fore the source of the confusion surrounding the
debate reviewed in sections 2 and 3.
Before doing this, however, let’s see how the generalized SEM framework is
able to address the challenges that standard analyses of dependencies face in the
context of general relativity. The following discussion comes with an important
caveat, namely, that the application of the SEM framework to concrete cases from
general relativity is still a mostly unexplored line of research: to my knowledge,
the only paper that follows this approach is Vassallo and Hoefer (2019), where the
question regarding the causal nature of frame-dragging effects in general relativity
is analyzed in terms of generalized structural models. As a consequence, what
I am going to present here is the general conceptual strategy thanks to which
the SEM framework deals with the issues related to dependence analysis. The
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concrete implementation of such a strategy would clearly depend on the particular
case studied.
The first issue regards the way we can evaluate counterfactual changes. As
we have seen, given a solution 〈gµν,Tµν〉 of (1) representing the “actual” situation,
there is in general no clear-cut criterion to single out the solution 〈g˜µν, T˜µν〉 that
is “most similar” to 〈gµν,Tµν〉 and represents the implementation of the counter-
factual change considered. To put it in the language of possible world semantics,
there is in general no cogent way to single out the possible world nearest to the
actual one because there is no spatiotemporal structure “shared” among possible
worlds that constitutes a standard against which counterfactual variation can be
evaluated. By adopting the SEM framework, we solve the issue because we do
not evaluate the truth values of counterfactuals directly against the solutions of
(1), but against a given structural model, i.e. by computing the values of the cor-
responding variables of the structural equations modeling a given situation. Using
fancy words, we can say that it is the particular structural model chosen that de-
termines the modal horizon of a given situation, which means that counterfactual
reasoning is structural model-dependent. For example, going back to the disap-
pearing mass case of section 2, if the structural model we are working with is
informative enough and rightly captures the dependencies in the actual world, we
just have to set the material variables in the dependence chain to zero and check
to see what geometric facts obtain as a consequence in order to see which vacuum
solution of general relativity represents this new situation. If, on the other hand,
by setting the material variables to zero we get a situation incompatible with the
laws of general relativity (e.g. geometrical facts not encoded in any vacuum solu-
tion of (1)), this means that the structural model does not pass the test, and so it is
not accurate.
The problem of trans-world identification of spacetime points and regions is
dealt with along the same lines. Under the SEM framework, any counterfactual
change in a spacetime region A in a solution of (1) just translates into a change of
value(s) of the variable(s) representing A in the structural equations of an appro-
priate model. Again, if the structural model works well, this new situation will be
depicted by another solution of (1), which will thus represent the counterfactual
situation in which the very same A were to be changed. Note how this way of
defining identity by stipulation is akin to what physicists do in concrete cases. For
example, when dealing with a perturbation of a background metric, they map the
perturbed spacetime against the unperturbed background in a way that associates
each point P of the latter to a point P′ of the former (see, e.g., Bruni et al., 1997,
especially section 3).
Likewise, for counterfactuals involving small local changes in a solution of
(1) that leave the rest of the universe untouched, all we have to do is to adopt
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an accurate, i.e. fine-grained enough, structural model that represents the actual
dependence chain, “zoom in” the particular situation by looking at the variables
that describe the local state of affairs, change their values as required, and then
see whether and how this change globally affects the dependence chain. Clearly,
we cannot perform such an operation directly on a solution of (1). Nonetheless,
we can use the structural model to “transition” from the starting solution of the
field equations (compatible with the starting values of the variables figuring in the
structural equations) to a new one which encloses the changed state of affairs. The
key requirement, once again, is that the structural model be fully compatible with
the laws of general relativity, otherwise the changed state of affairs fixed by the
new values of the structural variables might not be encoded in any solution of (1).
Also in this case, the SEM framework offers a clear strategy to bypass the problem
with model-wide interventions that Bartels’ proposal had.
The reader unsympathetic towards this generalized SEM framework might
point out that the general strategy sketched above does not eliminate the arbitrari-
ness involved in the evaluation of counterfactuals, but just shifts it to a method-
ological or pragmatic perspective: if a structural model works, then we can use
it for counterfactual reasoning without being bothered too much by metaphysical
questions about modality. This is a fair remark which, however, does not challenge
in any way the effectiveness of the SEM framework in treating counterfactual sit-
uations in general relativity. The general strategy I have just presented might be
as conceptually nasty and inelegant as you want (depending on your philosophical
tastes, of course), but still it provides a robust template for implementing struc-
tural models that are able to cope with the usual troubles that standard analyses of
dependence face in general relativity.
Moving on, note how the SEM framework, in virtue of its loose and liberal in-
terventionist attitude, does not require any notion of physical production in order
to define the wiggling of the variables, thus dodging any potential issue related to
the description of local physical processes in general relativity. If to this we add
that the SEM framework deals with facts rather than physical events, we under-
stand why it handles cases of causation by absence without being committed to the
actual physical production of absences. Hence, if –for the sake of the argument–
we bite the bullet with Katzav’s challenge and claim that spacetime just causes
the absence of inexplicable changes in the trajectories of freely-falling bodies, we
have no problem to coherently render such a claim via a structural model that
resembles the plant watering case. Such a model would back up a perfectly fine
explanation of why freely-falling bodies do not move erratically, which does not
mention at any point that spacetime literally produces the absence of erratic mo-
tions.
Having argued that the SEM framework is a legitimate and promising ap-
proach to analyzing dependencies in general relativity, let us apply it to the case of
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geodesic motions. Our model aims to account for the geometry of spacetime gµν




i∈N. In order to construct a general
model of this dependence that is compatible with general relativistic dynamics, all
we have to do is to follow the steps already sketched in section 2 when discussing
Bartels’ proposal.
If we set the exogenous variables to model certain facts about the metric tensor
itself and we link their variation to the endogenous variables encoding facts about
the geodesic motions xµi (λ) via a certain number of functional relations symbol-
ized by fi, in the end we get a set of structural equations that schematically look
like xµi (λ)
←
= fi(gµν). To reiterate a point already made earlier, these equations need
not be literally (1), (2), and (3). These latter equations would have to be used if
we were interested in providing a detailed picture of the geodesic motions over a
given spacetime, but here we want to construct a generic model that just captures
the dependence of some facts on other facts in a theoretical context where the laws
of general relativity hold. Hence, the role of (1), (2), and (3) in this case is that
of a conceptual constraint: for a structural model to rightfully capture the map of
dependencies in a given situation, it has to be consistent with the laws of general
relativity (hence, we cannot have situations where, say, by increasing spacetime
curvature in a region A the geodesic deviation decreases over A).
Given that we are interested in providing a general picture of how the analysis
work, we are not interested in the particular form that these functional relations
can take, the only constraint being that they capture, in the sense discussed above,
the right counterfactual patterns encoded in general relativistic dynamics. So let’s
just assume that we get to a model with a chain of dependence of the form:




Is this dependence causal or metaphysical? This is a clear case in which standard
grounding/causation demarcation criteria are ill-suited for the analysis. For exam-
ple, the synchronicity/diachroneity criterion looks odd in a context where (i) there
is no “absolute” temporal ordering against which we should evaluate the relation-
ship between facts, and (ii) some facts are about time itself. The same limitations
apply to the fundamentality/temporality criterion, especially given that the struc-
tural equations do not carry any useful information to evaluate the dependence
based on this criterion. Fortunately, we can resort to the law-based demarcation
criterion proposed at the end of section 4. According to this criterion, all we have
to do is to look at the mediating principles that justify drawing the arrow in the
above graph. By doing this, we immediately realize that the main justification
comes from the Einstein field equations, from which the equations of motion (2)
follow. Given that the Einstein field equations are to be considered as laws of
nature, it looks like we have reached a verdict: the above dependence is causal
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in nature. However, this conclusion would be too quick because we need another
piece of information in order to justify such a dependence.
The problem is that the Einstein field equations do not single out a connection:
many of them can go along with the same solution 〈gµν,Tµν〉. This is why two con-
straints are placed ab initio on the connection, namely, (a) to be torsion-free, and
(b) to be compatible with the metric tensor, i.e. to satisfy the relation ∇g = 0. It
is important to stress the fact that these constraints are not placed to preserve the
internal consistency of general relativity but, rather, they are theory-defining. In
fact, relaxing or giving up on them would lead to entirely different but still con-
sistent theories (see, e.g., Hehl et al., 1976). Hence, (a) and (b) can be considered
contingent law-like conditions rather than mathematical constraints that hold by
metaphysical necessity. These two constraints are enough to single out a unique
connection because, according to the fundamental theorem of Riemannian geom-
etry (whose proof can be found in any decent differential geometry textbook, such
as Lee, 2009), there is just one torsion-free connection compatible with a given
metric tensor, that is, the Levi-Civita connection (whose components are in fact
given by (3)). We thus have to sharpen our model in order to bring this point to
the fore. To this extent, we add a further link in the chain:






We immediately see that the law-like condition (2) justifies the second link in
the chain.16 Instead, the justification for the first link comes from constraints (a)
and (b) –which can be considered part of the laws of general relativity– and the
fundamental theorem of Riemannian geometry, which is a mathematical result.
We hence have a case of mixed dependence. This conclusion nicely explains the
roots of the confusion surrounding the debate reviewed in sections 2 and 3: we
simply cannot force a standard reading that is purely causal or ground-like on the
dependence chain depicted above.
A possible objection to the analysis carried out so far is that it is totally mis-
guided, since it presupposes a one-way determination relation from geometrical
to material facts, where in fact the dependence relation that best depicts the Ein-
stein field equations is mutual: after all, this is exactly what the Misner, Thorne,
and Wheeler motto is all about! To this I reply that, although it is true that there
is no arrow on top of the equal sign in (1), still these equations do not depict a
mutual dependence tout-court. All the Einstein field equations say is that there is
no “supremacy” of material degrees of freedom over geometrical ones, and vicev-
16It is worth mentioning that the derivation of (2) from (1) through the condition that the co-
variant divergence of the stress-energy tensor vanishes works only if the Levi-Civita connection is
used (thanks to an anonymous reviewer for suggesting this point to me).
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ersa. Returning to the dependence chain depicted above, for sure we can render it
more accurate by adding a further link upstream, thus having:






Now, the first link in this chain represents how material facts determine geomet-
rical facts. However, there is no mutuality at all involved in this chain, since the
material facts upstream are entirely different from the material facts downstream.
For example, the first node may describe the overall material distribution of a bi-
nary system (e.g. on a Cauchy surface), while the last may describe the orbits that
the system follows.
The point becomes even stronger if we enlarge the upstream part of the chain,
remembering the functional dependence of the stress-energy tensor:
Facts about Φ







Note that the lower first node does not coincide with the third and, likewise, the
upper first node does not overlap with the second. Take, for example, the case of
the Schwarzschild solution to (1) in the interior of a star (see Wald, 1984, section
6.2, for a derivation of this solution). In this case “Facts1 about gµν” include that
the geometry is static and spherically symmetric, while “Facts2 about gµν” involve
a more detailed characterization of the geometry, including its dependence on
the total mass of the body. Similarly, “Facts about Φ” include that matter is a
fluid with such and such density and pressure, while “Facts about Tµν” involve
a detailed characterization of the stress-energy tensor, including the fact that the
4-velocity of the fluid is such and such as a consequence of spacetime being static.
Coming back to a general discussion of the above chain, note that neither of
the two first nodes is dependent on the other, which represents the fact that, ac-
cording to general relativity, there is no material fact that is more fundamental
than all geometric facts, and viceversa. In this sense, the analysis carried out in
this paper is fully faithful to Misner, Thorne, and Wheeler motto (whose represen-
tation is in fact encoded in the above chain), and to the dependencies encompassed
in (1). Moreover, note how, by expanding the dependence chain, its mixed char-
acter is reinforced. Indeed, now we have that the first (double) link is justified
by (mathematical) functional dependence, while the second invokes the Einstein
field equations plus boundary conditions.
In the end, what are the morals to be drawn from the above analysis? If we
take seriously the generalized SEM framework, including the law-based demar-
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cation criterion, then we have to conclude that the dependence relation under-
pinning general relativistic dynamics is definitely neither pure causation nor pure
grounding.17 This, by itself, is not a huge achievement: already at the end of
section 3 we reached the conclusion that this relation is too “physics-friendly” to
be just grounding yet not “physically active” enough to be just causation. How-
ever, the generalized SEM framework supplies us with a new perspective on the
issue. Indeed, while before we assumed that grounding and causation were totally
unrelated concepts, and this assumption made the conceptual tangle impossible
to loosen, now the SEM framework –being a unified analytical framework for
grounding and causation– suggests to us that a way out of the impasse is in fact to
accept that the two concepts are related in a substantial metaphysical sense, and
general relativity is a theory that makes this relatedness manifest. This, of course,
begs the question: in what way are grounding and causation related?
According to Wilson (2017), they are just one and the same thing. Otherwise
said, grounding is just a “metaphysical” way of causing. Hence, there is just a
unique fundamental dependence relation –which is a conceptual primitive–, which
may exhibit different “flavors”. Wilson calls this fundamental relation “causation”
and distinguishes the metaphysical flavor (which we would call “grounding”)
from the nomological one (which we would call “standard causation”). However,
this is just a matter of terminology. The gist of his thesis is that, where we previ-
ously saw two conceptually distinct dependence relations, now there is in fact just
one dependence relation at work. The benefits of adopting this view are rather
obvious: we get a parsimonious ideology and a unified explanatory framework
with a relatively small effort.
Under this view, there are no mixed chains of facts, since there is only one re-
lation involved. Indeed, the distinction between laws of nature and metaphysical
principles is useful only insofar as it explains why, up to now, metaphysicians had
the impression that grounding and causation were two conceptually distinct rela-
tions: simply, they have just focused on a distinction that cuts no metaphysical ice
as far as the relation of determination is involved. Such a “metaphysical illusion”
of there being two distinct dependence relations stems from the fact that meta-
physicians usually focus on clear-cut, well-behaved everyday situations. When,
however, fundamental physics comes into play, common intuitions are thrown out
of the window, and the metaphysical unity of dependence relations becomes man-
ifest, as the case of general relativity shows.
17Note that a similar conclusion would have been achieved even if we had adopted an alternative
approach to the construction of general relativity, such as that of Ehlers et al. (1972). According
to this approach, the direction of the dependence depicted on page 26 would have to be reversed.
However, the analysis of the nature of the dependence involved would proceed similarly to the one
presently carried out (the same mediating principles would have been invoked, only in a different
order).
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Wilson’s thesis is rather strong and surely controversial (see, e.g., Schaffer,
2016, section 4.5, for a critique of the grounding/causation unification thesis).
However, we do not need to go that far to clarify the issue at stake. For exam-
ple, we could maintain that, while grounding and causation are distinct concepts,
still they are related in that they represent two determinates of a common deter-
minable.18 Under this view, the law-based demarcation criterion determines a
metaphysical scale of nomic dependence, causation being at one end (full nomic
dependence) and grounding being at the other end (full non-nomic dependence).
Therefore, the dependence relation underpinning (1) falls somewhere in the mid-
dle of this scale, being some sort of metaphysical hybrid between causation and
grounding. This explains why other analytical frameworks, which do not envisage
this nomic dependence scale, are unfit to clarify the matter.
This is clearly not the place for adjudicating the dispute between dependence
monists and pluralists. More modestly, the point that I want to drive home is
that, by adopting a generalized SEM framework, it is possible (i) to elaborate a
strategy to overcome the common conceptual troubles that standard analyses of
dependence have in general relativity and (ii) to come up with some clear an-
swers regarding the metaphysical status of the dependence relation encoded in
the Einstein field equations. Of course, future work will have to show how the
framework overcomes said conceptual troubles in concrete cases. Moreover, both
monists and pluralists still have to deepen their own characterization of the dis-
cussed dependence relation –perhaps by looking at other fundamental physical
theories. However, even at this earlier stage, I hope to have shown that the appli-
cation of the generalized SEM framework to general relativity is a promising and
exciting line of research, which intertwines physics with metaphysics.
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